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Aim: This study aims to investigate the sensitivity level of liquidity and
leverage to investment decision between non- financially and financially
constrained firms at low and high investment firm. Materials and Methods:
The sample includes sharia firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the
period of 2011 to 2015 and 96 firms are selected as sample with 480
observations for data collection. Results: The results reveal that liquidity and
leverage have a positive influence to investment decision of all sampled firms,
and also firms with low and high investment value. Liquidity is more sensitive
to investment decision for financially constrained firms and for firms with low
investment value. Leverage is more sensitive to investment decision for non 
-financially constrained firms with high investment value. Conclusion: This
study concludes that there is a close interdependency between investment
decision and financing decision. Keywords: Interdependency, investment
decision, liquidity, leverage, financially constrained, non-financially
constrained. * Corresponding author: Business and Economics Faculty,
Diponegoro University, Semarang, Indonesia 6669 Introduction The purpose
of the firm is to increase the value of the firm. Firm value could be achieved if
the firm invests. Investment is an important factor in the firm's financial
function. Kim (2018) stated that firm value is solely determined by
investment decisions. The opinion could be interpreted that the investment
decision is very important, because to achieve the firm's goal is to maximize
shareholder wealth will only be generated through firm investment activities.
Investment decision in this research is capital expenditure. It is the
investment in fixed assets such as land or property, building, and equipment.
According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2013), capital budgeting is the overall
planning and decision-making process of spending on funds with a refund
period exceeding one year. The basic motive for capital expenditure is for the
expansion, replacement, or renewal of fixed assets or for benefits that may
be less tangible in the long-term. Shibata and Nishihara (2018) stated that
under perfect market conditions there is no relationship between investment
decisions and financing decisions. According to Brigham and Houston (2012),
despite the perfect market assumption eliminated, separation of investment
and financing decisions still occur despite slight modifications that is
managers should use the weighted average capital cost as a discount rate.
Even when capital structure has become relevant, whether due to tax factors
or due to other factors, there is still no direct relationship between
investment and financing. The existing is that the investment program is
decided first and then decided to financing. In order for investment decisions
are really aimed at maximizing firm value, so investment decisions should be
independent of financing decisions. Financing decisions can be an indicator by
the market to predict future prospects. Firms with good prospects will
address the need for funds by borrowing any investment opportunity.
However, if the prospect of a firm is unfavorable it will make the need for
funds continuously, so the firm will overcome the problem of financing needs
with new investment opportunity. The financing source of the firm can
basically come from internal and external sources. Funds collected from
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accumulation of unearned profit shares are said to be internal funds. Of
course, with the development of the firm, internal funds are insufficient, so
that funds from external sources are required. Funds originating from
external sources can be in the form of debt to other parties or in the form of
capital collected from the owner (through the issuance of stock to the public
or private placement). Modigliani and Miller’s statement is different from the
results of empirical research. Empirical research indicates a linkage between
investment decisions and financing decisions, in this case there is a link 
between the level of liquidity and the level of investment in many firms. The
empirical evidence of Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and Yang (2016), Quader
(2016) indicate that there is a relationship between liquidity and debt with 
investment decisions. The results of empirical research in Indonesia are
shown by Agung (2000) and Prasetyantoko (2007). Similar research findings
are also recommended by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) in Japan.
From the above empirical findings, it shows that there is a distinction
between the theory that investment decisions and financing decisions are
independent of the practices of firms. In addition, the results of the research
indicate a discrepancy in the findings of the sensitivity of firm investment
decisions with liquidity when moderated by financial constraints. Bayraktar
(2014), Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia
and Yang (2016), Quader (2016), George, Kabir, and Qian (2011) and Kim
(2014) found evidence that firm investment decisions are more sensitive to
liquidity in financially constrained firms hereafter abbreviated FC, compared
to non-financially constrained firms hereinafter abbreviated as NFC. In
contrast, Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012) and Cull, Li,
Sunc, and Xu (2014) found that firm investment decisions are more sensitive
to liquidity in NFC firms than FC firms. Similarly, the results of debt sensitivity
research on investment decisions of FC and NFC firms show different findings.
The results of Ameer (2014), Guariglia and Yang (2016) that investment
decisions are more sensitive to debt to FC firms than NFC firms. In contrast,
Ogawa (2015) found that the firm's investment decision was more sensitive
to debts to NFC firms. Research of Agung (2000) shows that the investment
of NFC and FC firms differs in response to debt levels. Investments issued by
FC firms respond negatively to debt levels, whereas NFC firms have no effect
on investment. Given the contrast of empirical evidence above, this study will
further examine the factors that distinguish the two opposing evidence,
namely by using the FC and NFC variables as moderators. Financial
constraints are the limitations of the firms in obtaining capital from available
financing sources to invest. According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
financial constraints occur when firms face a difference between the cost of
capital from internal financing sources and the cost of capital from external
financing sources. Based on the above description and the results of empirical
research, this research aims at examining the level of influence of liquidity
and debt to the investment decisions of the firm both the firm as a whole in
the sample and firm with low and high investment in FC and NFC firm. FC
firms refer firms that have financial constraints in making investments, while
NFC firms refer to firms that have no financial constraints in investing. FC
firms tend to use liquidity to fund investments. This is because FC firms have
limited access to capital markets and are relatively smaller, showing financial
constraints that will make it difficult for firms to take advantage of investment
opportunity for investment. In other words, FC firms have low firm value. 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) noted that the existence of
information asymmetry on external financing would incur external financing
costs more than internal financing, which resulted in less FC firms having
access to external financing. With these limitations, the investment decisions
of FC firms tend to be more sensitive to liquidity. Based on the difference of
research result, this research intends to reconcile the level of influence of 
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liquidity and debt to investment decision by entering variable of FC and NFC
as moderator in firm as a whole and firm having low and high investment. In
addition, this study also uses the classification of financial constrains firms
that are different from the previous research. Fazzari et al. (1988) classified
financial constrains into three categories, that is dividend payout ratio of low
(<10%) or grade 1 to high (20%) or class 3. Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
classified samples into five groups from financial low to high constrains with
an objective multivariate classification approach. Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011)
measured financial constrains using dummy variables of financial indicators,
namely cash holding (high and low), profitability (high and low), cash flow
(high and low), debt (high and low), and sales (high and low). Bayraktar
(2014)measures financial constrains using dummy variables, namely size of
capital stock (high and low), number of laborers (few and many), dividend
payout ratios (high and low), dividend to capital ratios (high and low), bond
rating (no bond rating and bond rating), total debt to capital ratio (high and
low), KZ Index. This study classified NFC and FC firms using four stages,
namely dividend policy, cash flow, debt, and investment opportunity.
Literature Review In theory, investment decisions are separated from
financing decisions. This is in line with the statement of Modigliani and Miller
(1958) that under perfect market conditions there is no relationship between
investment decisions and financing decisions. However, the results of
empirical research indicate that investment decision is influenced by financing
decision, which includes liquidity and debt and its sensitivity to financial
constrains firm. Financial constraints are the limitations of firm in obtaining
capital from available financing sources to invest. According to Kaplan and
Zingales (2000), financial constraints occur when firms face a difference
between the cost of capital from internal financing sources and the cost of
capital from external financing sources. By that definition all firms can be
classified as financial constraints. Having external financing that incurs a
small transaction fee is suitable to put the firm in the category of financial
constraints. The definition is also useful to distinguish the firm according to
the financial constraints category. Fazzari et al. (1988) state that financial
constraints show the sensitivity of investment and liquidity caused by
information asymmetry in the capital market resulting in external financing
such as debt is more expensive than internal financing so it is not risky for
managers to use internal financing sources to invest. According to Myers and
Majluf (1984), information asymmetry occurs because managers are more
aware of the firm's current earnings and investment opportunity compared to
outside investors. The manager also acts in accordance with the interests of
the firm's existing shareholders. Financial constraints are also caused by
agency problems. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers prefer
to use internal capital to finance investment because internal capital can
reduce the involvement of oversight from shareholders or external part that is
to investment decisions made by managers. Owners control management to
keep the utilization of internal capital for investment in line with the interests
of the owner. Investment decisions made by the firm are influenced by the
ability of the firm to generate cash that can meet long-term or short-term
needs or the so-called liquidity of the firm. Liquidity is the firm's ability to
fulfill its liabilities, especially short-term liabilities (Brigham & Ehrhardt,
2013). According to Brigham and Houston (2012), a liquid firm is a firm that
has such great strength that it is able to fulfill all its financial liabilities that
must be met immediately, the ability to pay is related to the implementation
of the production process. Liquidity is the firm's ability to generate cash to
meet both long-term and short-term firm needs (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997).
The definition explicitly indicates whether with the available cash the firm has
difficulty to fund its investment or not. The firm is said to have no difficulty in
financing its investment if the firm is able to generate cash in financing the
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investment. In this research, liquidity is proxies by cash flow. Cash flow
consists of cash inflows and outflow cash flow. Outflow cash is usually used to
make new investments, while cash inflows are the result of the investment.
According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2013), the cash flow statement is a
report explaining the impact of the firm's operating, investing and financing
activities on cash flows during one accounting period. The cash flows of firms
with high volatility levels have expenditures, research and development costs,
as well as lower advertising costs (Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 1997). This
means that different levels of investment will create different volatility, 
depending on the firm's investment objectives. Usually firms do not use debt
or equity markets so that cash flow volatility is not sharp, because the cost 
of entry into the capital market is also associated with the volatility of firm
cash flow. Research of Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia
and Yang (2016), Quader (2016), George et al. (2011), and Kim (2014)
shows that there is a link between liquidity with investment decisions. 
Empirical evidence in Indonesia is shown by Agung (2000) who found that
liquidity is positively associated with investment decisions. Based on the
description, the hypothesis proposed in this study is: H1: Liquidity has a
positive effect on investment decisions both in the firm as a whole and in the
firms with low and high investment. One of the mechanisms that can be used
to increase firm value is by increasing the proportion of debt. According to
agency theory, one of the bonding mechanisms to limit manager opportunist
behavior is to increase debt. Adding debt can reduce agency costs that can
increase firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The thing that needs to get
the firm's management attention in carrying out its duty to maximize the
value of the firm is the capital structure, which is a combination of debt and
equity used to finance the firm's long-term investment. It is very important
to be noticed by the management firm because: 1) the composition between
debt and equity will affect the average cost of capital, 2) the increase in debt
will increase the risk because the firm must bear the fixed costs (interest) to
be paid even though the firm is experiencing a loss. Capital structure is
defined as the long-term capital structure (both from internal and external
sources) available to finance the firm's activities. According to Brigham and
Houston (2012), long-term capital, meaning capital that can be used by firm
for more than one year. Therefore, the firm's capital structure can be
described by the ratio of debt to equity as well as total assets. Thus, when
the firm needs funds to make investments in capital expenditure, the firm
also needs resources, and one of them is from debt. Modigliani and Miller
(1959) suggest that as far as interest payments can be used to reduce the
tax burden, debt reduction will benefit the owner of the firm. However, such
benefits will be recognized by the cost of bankruptcy and possible personal
tax differences between income from equity and from debt. Theoretically the
firm should use the debt that will minimize the cost of the firm's capital. Debt
provides benefits and expenses simultaneously. Debt benefits are obtained in
the form of relatively low capital costs due to tax savings (Modigliani & Miller,
1959). Expenses incurred due to indebtedness create the cost of bankruptcy
as a result of a fixed expense to be borne. Therefore, the firms need to find
the optimal composition between debt and equity, which brings benefits to
the cost for investment that the firm can do to succeed and provide benefits
for the firm in the future. Research results of Ameer (2014) and Guariglia and
Yang (2016) show that debt has a positive effect on investment decisions.
Based on the above description, the hypothesis proposed in this study is the 
debt has a positive effect on investment decisions both on the firm as a
whole and in the firm with low and high investment. Managers prefer to use
internal capital to finance investments because internal capital can reduce the
involvement of oversight from shareholders or external parties to investment
decisions made by manager’s manager (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According
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to Fazzari et al. (1988) that FC firms tend to be more sensitive to internal
financing (liquidity) in making investments. This tendency is due to the
information asymmetry of external financing, so that external financing
(debt) is more expensive than internal financing resulting in less FC firm
having access to external financing sources. Result research of Carpenter and
Guariglia (2008), Chen, Cao, Zhang, and Dickinson (2013), Bayraktar (2014),
Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia and Yang
(2016), Quader (2016), George et al. (2011), and Kim (2014) shows that
investment decision of FC firm is more sensitive to liquidity than NFC firm. In
contrast, research by Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012),
and Cull et al. (2014) shows that investment from NFC firms is more sensitive
to liquidity than investment from FC firms. Based on the description, the
hypothesis proposed in this research is: H2: Liquidity is more influential on
investment decisions in FC firm than NFC firm both in the firm as a whole and
in firm with low and high investment. The firms with good prospects will
address the need for funds by borrowing for investment opportunity.
However, if the prospect of a firm is unfavorable it will make the need for
funds continuously, so the firm will overcome the problem of financing needs
with new investment opportunity. Issuance of new equity causes the firm's
value reflected in the loosing stock price. Information asymmetry will in
addition hamper the firm's ability to raise funds through the issuance of new
shares, will also create an imperfect demand elasticity of equity funds by
limiting access to retain earning (Myers, 1984). Transaction costs are
generally smaller than debt to equity to reduce the various costs arising from
the choice between debt and equity. Brigham and Houston (2012) argue that
the use of interest-bearing debt has advantages and disadvantages for the
firm. The advantages of using debt are: The interest cost reduces the taxable
income, so the cost of effective debt becomes lower, and Debt holder has no
voting rights so the owner can control the firm with less funds. While the loss
of debt usage is if the firm's business is not in good condition, the operating
income becomes low and not enough to cover the interest expense so that
the owner's property is reduced. Guariglia and Yang (2016) suggest that
firms with FC are less able to invest more when there is a good opportunity
by using internal cash or external funds. Firm investments are not only
related to cash operations but also related to external sources such as debt.
The firms with high debt typically allocate their debts for investment, if the
higher the debt the more assets the firm has. Mayer (1990) found: there is
ownership of the dominant financial resources in all firm, the average firm of
most that firm does not take into account the financial substance arising from
the capital market in the form of share, bonds, or short-term equity, and the
majority of external financing comes from bank debt in all country. In their
research, Ameer (2014), and Guariglia and Yang (2016) found that
investment decisions are more sensitive to debt on FC firms than NFC firms.
Instead Ogawa (2015) found that firm investment decisions are more
sensitive to debt to NFC firms than FC firms. Research of Agung (2000) show
that the investment of NFC and FC firms differs in response to debt levels.
Investments issued by FC firm respond negatively to debt levels, whereas
NFC firm have no effect on investment. Hence the hypothesis in this study is:
H3: The debt is more influential on investment decisions in NFC firm than FC
firm either overall or in firm with low and high investment. Materials and
Methods The population in this study is public firm listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange, with samples of sharia firms. Data required in this study is
the firm's financial statements from 2011 to 2015. Data obtained from IDX
and ICMD (Indonesia Capital Market Directory). The criteria of sampling
method are only to include sharia firms listed on the BEI and publish its
financial statements from 2011 to 2015 consistently. The independent
variables in this research are liquidity which is proxy by cash flow and debt
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which is proxy with debt to assets ratio (DAR). Cash flow is measured by net
income plus depreciation and/or amortization divided by fixed assets. DAR is
measured by total debt divided by total assets. Dependent variable in this
research is investment. Investment in this research is net capital expenditure
and calculated during period t. Investments are measured by fixed assets t
minus fixed assets t-1 divided by fixed assets. Fixed assets refer to land,
buildings and equipment. Cash flow and investment are divided by fixed
assets to control the effects of the firm's scale differences. The moderating
variables in this study are financial constraints classify into two, that is non-
financially constrained (NFC) and financially constrained (FC). In this
research to classify NFC and FC firm using four stages by looking at dividend
policy, cash flow, leverage, and investment opportunity. The initial
classification is built on dividend policy. Several research use dividend payout
ratios (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2011, Baños Caballero, García Teruel,
& Martínez Solano, 2014, Bayraktar, 2014, Fazzari et al., 1988, Kaplan &
Zingales, 1997). The firms that do not dividends are in FC category, while
firm that pay dividends are NFC category. Fazzari et al. (1988) suggest that
there are two possible explanations for why firms pay low dividends. First,
firms face the cost of expensive external financing sources because of the
information asymmetry that uses most of the profits to finance their
investments rather than paying high dividends. Second, the company does
not earn enough profit to pay dividends. The firms paying dividends are
included in the NFC category, while Pay = NFC the firms that do not pay
dividends are included in the FC category. The firms included in the FC
category may not be able to pay dividends for not being able to pay, but the
possibility of funds owned is used for other purposes such as for investment,
it is necessary to do the second classification by looking at cash flow. In the
second classification as used by Rousseau and Kim (2008), Bassetto and
Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012) firms with larger cash flows than the
average cash flow of all samples are categorized as NFC firm, which has a 
cash flow smaller than the average cash flow of all samples categorized as
FC. The firms with large cash flows tend not to experience constraints in
financing and conversely firm with small cash flows tend to experience
constraints in financing. The third classification is looking at investment
opportunity of the firm. The firm's investment opportunity in this case is
proxy by market to book ratio as used by Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009)
and Hovakimian and Titman (2003) in classifying NFC and FC firms. The firms
are in the NFC category if the market to book ratio is higher than the average
book to market ratio of all samples and the firm is in the FC category if the
market to book ratio is lower than the average book to market ratio of all
samples. The firms that have a high to market to book ratio mean the firm
has a market value that is higher than its book value that reflects the NFC
firm. Thus the NFC firm will easily obtain external sources of financing
because it has a high value of the value of the book, so investors will be
interested to buy the stock of the firm. Furthermore, to obtain more accurate
results in classifying NFC and FC firms, the financially constrained firms in the
third classification are followed by the fourth classification as done by
Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Bayraktar (2014) by looking at firm debt. The
firms that have high debt levels tend to be difficult to access external
financing sources and conversely firms with low debt levels tend to find it
easy to access external financing sources. Therefore, in this study the firms
that have debt ratio than the average ratio of debt would become the
samples of the study, and they are categorized as NFC firm, while the firm
that has debt ratio is higher than the average ratio of debt of all samples then
categorized as FC firm. Of the four stages of the classification, then for more
clearly can be seen in Figure 1. Div High = NFC Un-pay High = NFC Low Low
= NFC CF Low MB High = FC Debt Figure 1: Classification of the firm 
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financially constrained and non -financially constrained In this case, Div. is
dividend, CF is cash flow, MB is the ratio of market to book proxy of
investment opportunity, Debt is debt, NFC is non-financially constrained, and
FC is financially constrained. So firm are categorized as NFC firms when they
pay dividends, have high cash flow, high market to book, and low debt. While
the firm is categorized as FC firms if the firm does not pay dividends, has a
low cash flow, low market to book, and high debt. The control variables in
this study are investment opportunity proxy by market to book (MB) and firm
SIZE measured by Ln total assets. The test model in this study used three
moderation regression equations as follows: INVATit = β0 + β1CFATit +
β2DARit + β3Dit + β4 CFit*Dit + β5 DARit*Dit + MBit β6 + SIZEit β6 + uit
(1) INVLOWit = β0 + β1CFATit + β2DARit + β3Dit + β4 CFit*Dit + β5
DARit*Dit + MBit β6 + SIZEit β6 + uit (2) INVHIGHit = β0 + β1CFATit +
β2DARit + β3Dit + β4 CFit*Dit + β5 DARit*Dit + MBit β6 + SIZEit β6 + uit
(3) In this case, INVAT is an investment in capital expenditures divided by
fixed assets in the firm as a whole (total sample), INVLOW is an investment
in a firm with low investment that has an investment value below the average
value of the sample, INVHIGH is an investment in a firm with high investment
that has an investment value above the average value of the sample, as a
dependent variable, CFAT is a cash flow divided by fixed assets which is a
proxy for liquidity and DAR (debt to assets ratio) as an Table 1: Descriptive
statistics among variables Variable Minimum Maximum INVAT 0,110 0,249
CFAT 0,140 3,456 DAR 0,060 1,800 MB 0,950 2,629 SIZE 7,774 18,132 N
480 independent variable, D is the dummy variable of FC and NFC firms, 1 is
FC and 0 is an NFC firm, CF*D is the interaction between CF and dummy
variables and DAR*D is the interaction between DAR and dummy variables,
as moderating variables, and MB (market to book) are the proxy of
investment opportunity and SIZE is the size of the firm as a control variable.
Cash flows and investments are divided by fixed assets to control the effect of
firm scale differences. Results and Discussion Based on the sample selection
criteria of sharia firms listed on the BEI and publish their financial statements
from 2011 to 2015 consistently, it is obtained a sample of 165 sharia firms for
five years with the number of observations of 825. From 165 firms, there are
69 firms whose data outliers because have a value of cash flow, market to
book, debt to assets and investments is negative, so it is excluded from the
sample. So the final sample of this study amounted to 96 sharia firms for five
years with a number of 480 observations. The descriptive statistics of
variables in this study can be seen in Table 1 below. Mean 0,1647 1,6401
0,7014 1,6253 12,7728 Standard Deviation 0,0294 0,6641 0,3797 0,3206
0,8772 Note: INVAT (investment divided by fixed assets) as the dependent
variable, CFAT (cash flow divided by fixed assets) and DAR (total debt divided
by total assets) as independent variable, MB (equity market value divided by
book value of equity) and SIZE (Ln total assets) as control variable Moderate
variables in this study used dummy, 1 for FC firms and 0 for NFC firms. Firm
classification is categorized as FC and NFC seen from dividend, cash flow,
market to book, and debt. The firms categorized as FC firm if the firm does
not pay dividends, have cash flow and market to book that are lower than the
sample average, Pay and have debt higher than the sample average. While
the firms are categorized as NFC firm when firm pay dividends, have cash
flow and market to book higher than the average sample, and have debt
lower than the average sample. The results of the classification of firm
categorized as FC and NFC can be seen in Figure 2. D (275) High Un-pay CF
(175+48=223) High (305) Low MB (223+59=282) Low (305-48=257) Low
Debt (282+64=346) (257-59=198) High (198-64=134) Figure 2: Result of
classification of the firm financially constrained and non-financially
constrained Figure 2 shows that the initial classification is seen from the
dividend, an observer firm paying a dividend of 275 and not paying a
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dividend of 305. In the second classification, firms are observed not paying
any dividends any more cash flow, at this stage indicating that has a cash
flow higher than the average sample increased 48 to 223 and which is smaller
than the average sample decreased 48 to 257 observations. In the third
classification, the observed firm that are still low cash flow is seen again
market to book it, the classification results show the number of firm that have
market to book higher than the average sample increased 59 to 282
observations, while firm that have market to book lower than the sample
mean reduced by 59 to 198 observations. In the last classification of the firm
that still high market to book it is seen again its debt, the classification
results indicate that firm that have debt lower than the average sample
increased 64 to 346 and Table 2: Descriptive statistics of FC and NFC firms
observed firm have debt above the average sample is reduced 64 to 134
observations. Thus, firms categorized as FC were observed 134 times, while
firms categorized as NFC got 346 observations. The descriptive statistics of
research variables in the firm FC and NFC can be seen in the following Table
2. Variable Min Max FC Mean SD Min NFC Max Mean SD Dividend CFAT DAR
MB SIZE INVAT N 0,140 0,060 1,012 9,554 0,120 2,709 1,424 2,548 16,485
0,230 Pay 134 1,463 0,599 1,543 12,772 0,161 0,535 0,306 0,283 1,393
0,029 0,144 0,110 0,950 7,774 0,110 3,456 1,800 2,629 18,132 0,249 Un-
pay 346 1,708 0,741 1,657 12,773 0,165 0,696 0,397 0,329 2,035 0,029
Note: Dividend (pay and un-pay), CFAT (cash flow divided by fixed assets),
DAR (total debt divided by total assets) in percent, MB (equity market value
divided by book value of equity) in time, is a classification of FC and NFC,
whereas SIZE (Ln total assets) as control variable and INVAT (investment
divided by fixed assets) are dependent variable and not classification of FC
and NFC In this study, testing was conducted to the entire investment of the
sampled firms with low and high investment. The firms include into the high
investment category if the value of investment is higher than the average
sample (0,215) and into the category of firm with low investment if the
investment value is lower than the average value of the sample. Descriptive
statistics of the firms with low and high investment can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of low and high firm investment Variable Min
Low Investment Max Mean SD Min High Investment Max Mean SD INVAT
CFAT DAR MB SIZE N 0,110 0,142 0,060 0,950 7,774 0,210 3,456 1,790
2,629 18,132 0,157 1,670 0,704 1,631 12,756 429 0,021 0,613 0,352 0,326
1,867 0,216 0,329 0,175 1,027 8,637 0,249 2,651 1,310 2,084 16,490 51
0,226 1,568 0,629 1,577 12,913 0,009 0,578 0,315 0,261 1,970 Note: INVAT
(investment divided by fixed assets) as the dependent variable, CFAT (cash
flow divided by fixed assets) and DAR (total debt divided by total assets) as
independent variable, MB (equity market value divided by book value of
equity) and SIZE (Ln total assets) as control variable The results of testing 
hypothesis can be seen in Table 4 below. Table 4: The result of testing 
hypothesis Variable Total Sample coefficients t value Low Investment
coefficients t value High Investment coefficients t value CF 0,005 DAR 0,10 D
-0, 018 CFAT*D 0, 007 DAR *D 0, 010 MB -0, 001 SIZE 0,001 Constanta
0,144 2,094** 0,005 2,511*** 0,006 -1,702** -0,004 2,101** 0,004 1,138
0,007 -0,338 -0,007 0,962 0,001 0,157 2,400*** 0,009 1,689** 0,008
-0,422 0,006 2,043** -0,003 -0,361 -0,007 -2,039** 0,001 0,392 -0,001
0,214 3,897*** 1,809** 0,535 0,464 -2,055** 0,187 -0,945 Note: **
Significant at level 5% (1,645) *** Significant at level 1% (2,326) CFAT
(cash flow divided by fixed assets) is the proxy of liquidity and DAR (total
debt divided by total assets) is the proxy of debt policy is an independent
variable, D (dummy variable, 1 for financially constrained firm, 0 for non-
financially constrained firm), CFAT*D (interaction between CFAT and firm
dummy financially constrained) and DAR*D (interaction between DAR and
dummy of non-financially constrained firm) are moderating variables, MB
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(equity market value divided by book value of equity) and SIZE (Ln total
assets) are control variables Based on the result of testing hypothesis in Table
4, the total samples show that liquidity and debt have a significant positive
effect on investment decision. In addition Table 4 above also shows that the
liquidity moderation variable with financial constrains is the interaction
between CFAT and dummy (CFAT*D) has a significant positive effect on the
investment decision or it can be interpreted that liquidity is more sensitive to
investment decision on FC firm than NFC firm. However, the reverse result
shows that the moderation variable of debt policy with financial constrains
that is DAR interaction with dummy (DAR*D) has an insignificant positive
effect on investment decision, in other words that debt is not sensitive to
investment decision at NFC firm. When the sample is divided into two that is
firm that have low investment and firm that have high investment, the results
showed that liquidity and debt have a significant positive effect on investment
decisions firm. However, different results occur when moderated by financial
constraints. In low-investment firms, liquidity is more sensitive to investment
decisions of FC firms than NFC firms, while debt is not sensitive to investment
decisions of NFC firm. In contrast to high-investment firm, debt is more
sensitive to investment decisions of NFC than FC firms, while liquidity is not
sensitive to investment decisions of FC firms. Table 4 also shows that liquidity
positively affects to investment decisions both in the total sample firm and in
the firm with low and high investment. This influence shows that with high
liquidity, firms have the opportunity to invest more in capital expenditure,
such as investment in fixed assets such as land or property, buildings, and
equipment. However, with high firm liquidity it is sensitive to agency conflicts.
According to the agency theory that managers prefer to use internal capital to
finance investments because internal capital can reduce the involvement of
oversight from shareholders or external parties to investment decisions made
by managers. Managers tend to choose projects that outsiders find difficult to
monitor, thereby allowing managers to make decisions that benefit them.
Managers also prefer to keep free cash flows instead of distributing them to
shareholders. The higher the free cash flows the greater the freedom of
managers in controlling the firm's resources (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In
addition, Myers and Majluf (1984) assert that with the asymmetry
information, internal financing sources are cheaper than external financing
such as debt, so the firm tend to choose internal financing rather than
external financing. The results of this study are in accordance with research
of Almeida and Campello (2007), Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), Chen et al.
(2013), Bayraktar (2014), Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa
(2015), Guariglia and Yang (2016), Quader (2016), George et al. (2011), Kim
(2014), Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Chen and Chen (2012), and Cull et al.
(2014). The results of the research in Table 4 above also shows that the debt 
has a significant positive effect on investment decisions both on the total
sample firm and in the firm with low and high investment. As explained in
agency theory, one of the mechanisms that can be used to increase the value
of a firm is by increasing the proportion of debt as one of the bonding
mechanisms to limit the manager's opportunistic behavior. Adding debt can
reduce agency costs that can increase firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
From these statements can also be interpreted that the debt can be used by
firms to invest in order to increase the value of the firm. The finding of this
study show that the sources of debt funds are used by firm to make
investments have been right on target. So it can be said that with the source
of financing from the debt, the firm can make investments as expected,
which can increase the value of the firm. The results of this study are in
accordance with research of Ameer (2014), Guariglia and Yang (2016). The 
results of this study also indicate that there is interdependency between
investment decision and financing decision. This means that when the firm
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has a goal to increase its value, then one that must be done is to make
investments, and to make investments then the firm needs financing sources,
in this case is the source of financing from the internal cash form (proxy of
liquidity) and external financing that is debt. The results of this study differ
from statement of Modigliani and Miller (1958) which states that in perfect
market conditions there is no relationship between investment decisions and
financing decisions. The influence of liquidity and debt on investment
decisions differs when moderated by FC and NFC firm, both investment
stirrings in the total sample of the firm as well as investment decisions in firm
with low or high investment. This is indicated by the result that liquidity has
more influence on investment decision on FC firm than NFC firm. According to
Fazzari et al. (1988) is attributed to information asymmetry on external
financing, so that external financing such as debt is more expensive than
internal financing which results in less FC firm having access to external
financing sources. In addition the FC firm is relatively smaller, indicating
financial limitations so it will be difficult for firm to take advantageous
investment opportunity for investment. In other words, FC firm have low firm
value. Thus, FC firms tend to be more sensitive to liquidity in investing in
total sample of the firm and firm with low investment. The results of this
study are in accordance with research of Chen et al. (2013), Bayraktar
(2014), Ameer (2014), Črnigoj and Verbič (2014), Ogawa (2015), Guariglia
and Yang (2016), Quader (2016), George et al. (2011), and Kim (2014). In
the sample of the firm as a whole found the result that the debt is not
sensitive to the investment decision on the NFC firm. In contrast to the firm
with low investment, debt is more sensitive to investment decisions in NFC
firms than FC firms. The results of this study in accordance with research
Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) and Ogawa (2015). The firms with good
prospects will address the need for funds by borrowing to invest. Refer to
Guariglia and Yang (2016) the firm that FC is less able to invest more when
there is a good opportunity by using internal cash or external funds. Firm
investments are not only related to cash operations but also related to
external sources such as debt. The firms with high debt typically allocate their
debts for investment, if the higher the debt the more assets the firm has. In
other words, the firm with no financial constraints (NFC) will easily access the
debt to invest. This means that NFC firms are more sensitive to debt in
investing. Conclusion From the results of testing hypothesis, the conclusions
of this study are: first, liquidity and debt have a positive effect on investment
decisions. This influence shows that with high liquidity and debt, the firm has
the opportunity to invest more in capital expenditure that is investment in
fixed assets such as land or property, buildings, and equipment. So the firm
will be able to alert the value of the firm. This indicates the existence of
interdependency between financing decisions in this case liquidity and debt
with investment decisions on the firm in Indonesia, especially the firm on the
samples. Second, liquidity is more influential on investment decision on FC
firm than NFC firm or in other words liquidity is more sensitive to investment
decision on FC firm than NFC on total sample of firm and on the firm with low
investment. This is due to the asymmetry of information on external
financing, so that external financing such as debt is more expensive than
internal financing which results in less FC firm having access to external
financing sources. This shows that investment decision of FC firm is more
sensitive to liquidity. Third, debt sensitivity to investment decisions is
different in NFC firm. In the total sample of the firm, the debt does not
significantly affect the investment decision on the NFC firm. However, in the
sample of firm with high investment value, debt has more influence on
investment decision on NFC firm than FC firm. In other words, debt is more
sensitive to investment decisions on NFC firms than FC firms. This is because
NFC firms tend to have easier access to external sources of funds, in this case
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debt, so as to easily adjust financing sources for investments that show
greater financial flexibility. This means that NFC firms in investing are more
sensitive to debt. Limitation The limitations in this study include: firstly, the
sample only on the sharia firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange with
a research period of only five years, for further research can increase the
sample by comparing sharia firms in some countries and longer periods,
secondly, the numbers of sample are too limited because there is any outlier
data that have value of cash flow, market to book, debt to assets, and
investment is negative, thirdly, this study uses only two independent
variables of liquidity and debt, future research may need to add another
relevant independent variable such as size or growth, and finally, samples is
pooling so that one firm that entered the category of FC firm this year could
be included in the category of NFC firm in the next year. Robustness test
should be made, by holding-out sample. The only sample tested that is five
years or three years in a row is in the same category. Acknowledgement The
authors would like to thank Indonesian Endowment Finance of Education
(LPDP) because the study is fully sponsored by LPDP. References Agung, J.
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